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he lending activity of commercial banks has long received considerable
attention as an important contributor to the performance of the economy.
This attention has, perhaps, become sharper in the wake of the difﬁcul-
ties experienced by the banking industry in the 1980s. In recent years, the public
perception of bank lending seems to have swung through a cycle. In the early
1990s, the prevailing view was that the bank loan market was experiencing a
credit crunch in which banks set unreasonably high credit standards, denying
credit to qualiﬁed borrowers.1 By late 1994, with growth in bank loans picking
up, some voiced concerns that banks were possibly becoming too loose in their
standards for acceptable credit risks. These concerns appeared in the pages of
the American Banker and other professional journals and in speeches by the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency.2
Do swings from tightness to laxity in credit standards constitute an inherent
part of bank lending activity? Some observers have suggested that such cycles
can be caused by an imperfection in bank credit markets that results in a sys-
tematic tendency for banks to overextend themselves during general expansions
of lending. In some expressions of this view, the imperfection is the result of
government intervention in banking markets, while in others it results from
the very nature of credit markets. In any case, the implied consequence is a
cycle in lending behavior that is distinct from and may exert an independent
inﬂuence on the general business cycle.
The existence of a systematic cycle in lending standards could have im-
portant public policy implications. If lending displays a bias toward too much
The author thanks Tom Humphrey, Mary Finn, Tony Kuprianov, and John Walter for their
comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do
not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal
Reserve System.
1 For general discussions of credit crunches and the experience of the early 1990s, see
Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Owens and Schreft (1995).
2 See, for instance, Dunaief (1995), Connor (1995), and Stevenson (1994).
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risk during expansions, resulting in increased risks of bank failures and losses
to bank insurance funds, then bank regulation might justiﬁably seek to smooth
out lending cycles. Placing greater scrutiny and restrictions on bank lending
during periods of loan growth would slow the expansions but limit ensuing
losses.
Justifying a regulatory policy aimed at eliminating or reducing cyclical
swings in credit standards and lending activity requires that expansions of credit
be inherently excessive. Excessive, however, is a relative term. A relevant ques-
tion in this regard concerns the behavior of an “ideal” credit market, in which
there is no source of market failure or government-induced distortion. Would
such a market produce cycles in lending standards? This is the question that
this article explores. First, Section 1 describes the notion of cycles in standards
in a bit more detail. The following sections examine a stylized model of credit
market behavior. This model suggests that lending standards might naturally be
expected to change with market conditions. In fact, the model serves to make
the point that in a well-functioning credit market, an expansion of lending
almost necessarily implies an easing of standards and the extension of credit
to “riskier borrowers.” This is true when borrower riskiness is deﬁned in terms
of borrower-speciﬁc characteristics drawn, for instance, from a commercial
borrower’s recent income statement or balance sheet. These characteristics tell
only part of the story of the true expected proﬁtability of a loan to a particular
borrower. Also important are aggregate conditions that affect the demand for
the borrower’s product or the supply of its inputs. These factors are typically
not well captured by borrower-speciﬁc indicators of credit quality.
1. CYCLES IN CREDIT STANDARDS
In discussions of bank lending activity, the notion of cycles in lending standards
typically begins with expansions; standards fall with heightening competition
in expansions and rise in contractions as banks respond to their own capital
shortfalls or the constraints of regulators. On the downside, this view is related
to the notion of a credit crunch, which has received much attention in recent
years. On the upside, the view often seems to embody the belief that expansions
of credit are inherently excessive. In March of 1995, for instance, the Ameri-
can Banker reported on growing concerns about easing credit standards and on
warnings from the loan ofﬁcers’ professional association advising lenders to
resist competitive pressures and maintain credit quality.3 Such warnings come
very close to the caution voiced by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
in speeches given in late 1994.
If, indeed, there is a natural tendency for expansions of credit to push down
lending standards, then it would naturally follow that expansions would lead,
3 See Mathews (1995).     
J. A. Weinberg: Cycles in Lending Standards? 3
at least sometimes, to signiﬁcant increases in losses on loans. Further, the con-
traction phase of the credit cycle could be worsened as banks ﬁnd themselves
with bad assets on their books. Hence, under this view the primary driving
force of cycles in the credit markets is the propensity of lenders to succumb
to an unrealistic optimism in good times, creating lending booms that sow the
seeds of their own demise. Just such a description of the cycle appears in some
discussions by credit professionals.4 In this sort of description the expansion
of lending could, itself, be the impulse that drives the cycle, as a spontaneous
wave of optimism hits the lending community. Alternatively, the expansion
could be an overreaction to other shocks to the economy that “legitimately”
shift the supply of or demand for credit.
The view of cycles outlined above is one of ﬂuctuations in a number of
variables. In this view, the cycle in lending standards coincides with the cycle in
the amount of lending, while movements in the amount of lending are followed
by movements in loan losses. In particular, an increase in lending activity is
followed by an increase in losses. Does this pattern appear in the data? Figure
1 displays the behavior of the growth rate of total loans and loan charge-offs as
a fraction of total loans at insured banks and thrifts in the United States from
1950 to 1992.
While the relationship is not striking, there do appear to be periods in which
unusually strong loan growth preceded rising charge-offs. For instance, in 1972
and 1973, annual loan growth was about 18 percent compared to around 10
percent in 1971 and 1974. From 1973 through 1976, charge-offs, as a percent
of total loans, grew from 0.33 percent in 1973 to 0.77 percent in 1976. It is
important to note that accounting standards allow banks some discretion as to
when to write off a nonperforming loan.5 Consequently, charge-offs resulting
from an episode of poor credit quality can be spread out over time, delaying
and smoothing the apparent response of losses to an expansion of lending. The
last several years of data in Figure 1 seem to reﬂect the downside of the cycle:
an extended period of rising losses followed by a period of declining loan
growth, culminating in two years of declines in the level of lending activity.
While not conclusive, the behavior of loan growth and charge-offs is not
inconsistent with the notion of a cycle in lending standards. Alternatively, one
might seek more direct evidence on lending standards. The Federal Reserve
Board’s Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices con-
tains explicit questions on this topic. Schreft and Owens (1991) provide a
detailed description of this survey evidence. Broadly stated, they ﬁnd that loan
ofﬁcers’ self-professed tendency to tighten lending standards follows a cyclical
pattern that tends to peak (attain the greatest tightening of lending standards)
4 See, for instance, Mueller and Olson (1981) and Stevenson (1994).
5 This issue is discussed in Darin and Walter (1994).   
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Figure 1 Loan Growth and Charge-Offs








































just prior to or during general economic downturns. They ﬁnd similar behavior
in responses to questions about loan ofﬁcers’ general willingness and unwill-
ingness to make loans. Further, peaks in the loan growth series in Figure 1
tend to occur at or around the troughs in the lending standards series studied
by Schreft and Owens. In other words, the survey data suggest that low self-
reported standards coincide with high growth in actual lending, while bankers
report tightest credit around periods when lending growth is slow.
An additional source of information on lending standards could come from
examining the characteristics of banks’ borrowers. If borrowers’ average ﬁ-
nancial conditions become weaker, then one might be able to conclude that
standards have eased, especially if one can control for the general state of the
economy. Cunningham and Rose (1994) perform such a study. They examine
evidence on the ﬁnancial conditions of small and mid-sized commercial borrow-
ers. This evidence appears to be consistent with a general easing of standards
from 1978 to 1988 and a tightening from 1988 to 1991. Except for 1978 itself,
1978 to 1988 was a period of fairly steady loan growth, with a few relatively
strong years. By contrast, 1988 to 1991 was a period of generally declining
loan growth. Hence, this study serves to conﬁrm the general coincidence of
changes in standards with movements in total lending activity.
The evidence discussed above is broadly consistent with the notion of
cycles in lending standards. More difﬁcult is the question of whether expansions
represent a systematic tendency of banks to become too easy in the extension     
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of credit. There are at least two views as to what might drive lenders to display
an excessively tolerant attitude toward credit risk. One view is that there is a
fundamental imperfection in ﬁnancial markets and, in particular, markets for
bank credit. Under this view, the source of the imperfection seems to be that
the credit quality of borrowers is difﬁcult and costly to observe. Banks spend
resources gathering information on borrower characteristics, but it is difﬁcult
for outside observers to verify the information obtained by the bank. Such limits
to the ﬂow of information form the basis of much of the recent work in the
theory of banking. Limited information, however, does not necessarily imply a
bias toward accepting greater risks. Indeed, if providers of funds feel that they
are at an informational disadvantage, the cost of funds could be higher than
in the case of perfect information. This could have the effect of making banks
less willing to accept risks than they otherwise might be.
In some discussions of cycles in lending the supposed market imperfection
simply seems to be a general failure of lenders to make good credit decisions.
Sometimes this failure takes the form of basing decisions on the decisions of
other lenders, rather than on an independent evaluation of market conditions.
A model of banking markets that encompasses this view is presented by Rajan
(1994). In that model, bankers are driven by a concern for their reputations,
which could suffer if they fail to expand credit while others are doing so.
Related to this view is the belief that competition drives lenders to ease their
standards.6 Hence, one might refer to this type of imperfection as the “herd
mentality” problem.
The second, and perhaps more widely advanced view on the source of
excessive risk tolerance by banks, is deposit insurance. It is well understood
by now that federal deposit insurance has the potential of distorting banks’
attitudes toward credit risk, and indeed there is an extensive literature on this
subject.7
There is nothing inherently cyclical in the distortion caused by deposit
insurance. In fact, by placing a limit on the losses a bank can incur, deposit
insurance is likely to have its greatest effect on incentives when the overall
ﬁnancial condition of banks is weak. This seems to run counter to the view of
a lending cycle in which banks overextend in good times, making themselves
vulnerable to adverse shocks. It is possible that the interaction of deposit in-
surance and the behavior of bank regulators could produce the type of cyclical
behavior described. Such behavior could arise if the scrutiny of and restrictions
on bank lending applied by examiners and regulators varied, after the fact, with
observed performance of banks. While times are good, regulators might impose
little interference, intervening only after signiﬁcant losses have been incurred.
6 This view is expressed in the discussion described by Randall (1994).
7 A notable statement of the problem is given by Kareken (1983).      
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Some have argued that the “prompt corrective action” requirements for regu-
lators in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA) embody just such a procyclical effect. On the other hand, recent,
pre-FDICIA experience might be better characterized by a different pattern of
regulatory response to changes in banks’ conditions. In particular, it is possible
that regulatory forbearance during the 1980s resulted in too few restrictions on
the activities of troubled banks.
Much of the research and writing on cycles in bank lending activity often
has been driven by the observation that expansions in credit-risk exposure tend
to be concentrated in a particular type of lending; lending for commercial real
estate development in New England in the 1980s is a typical example.8 From
the point of view of an individual bank, loan concentration implies a loan port-
folio that is, perhaps, not as well diversiﬁed as it might be. In an environment
characterized by deposit insurance and bank regulation, concentrations could
present a problem to regulatory agencies. The description of cycles driven
by concentrated expansions of lending, however, is very similar to the more
general description mentioned above; lenders take on excessive risks as the
market is swept up in a lending euphoria that skews individuals’ evaluations
of credit quality.
Each of the various views on market or regulatory failures driving cy-
cles in lending behavior embodies some theory of the behavior of banks and
ﬁnancial markets. While each may have the ability to explain some aspect of
observed behavior, the question remains: Compared to what? The following
sections explore the implications of a benchmark model, in the absence of
market imperfections or government intervention.
2. A MODEL OF A CREDIT MARKET
An explicit model of equilibrium in a market for loans is useful for interpreting
observed lending patterns. The model presented below is one without many of
the transaction costs and other frictions that are often thought to be important
to banking and credit markets. While such frictions are probably important
for an explanation of the institutional structure of these markets, they are not
necessarily essential to every aspect of observed market behavior. Exploration
of an “ideal” or frictionless model will help to uncover what aspects of observed
behavior result from market frictions and what aspects arise simply from the
competitive allocation of credit among heterogeneous borrowers.
First, it is useful to think of the activity in the model economy as tak-
ing place over two time periods. These two time periods might be thought
of as a component of a more explicitly dynamic model, in which aggregate
8 Randall (1994) summarizes the proceedings of a conference on this subject.     
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conditions evolve over time. A dynamic model would, ultimately, be better
suited to closely matching the notion of cycles in lending standards. In the
simple environment considered here, the forces that might drive cycles show
up clearly in the comparative statics of the two-period version of the model.
Since, in the model, lending standards arise as a characteristic of equilibrium,
one can examine directly how changes in exogenous (to the decisions of market
participants) market conditions change the equilibrium standards.
The demand side in the model economy’s credit market is composed of
a large number, N, of potential borrowers. Suppose that these are all business
borrowers. Each borrower’s business is particularly simple. A business requires
a ﬁxed amount of resources in the ﬁrst period and, if successful, produces a
ﬁxed amount of output in the second period. If unsuccessful, the business
produces nothing. Both input and output should be thought of as measured in
monetary units, and, for simplicity, it is useful to set the value of the ﬁxed
amount of inputs required equal to one. The output of a successful business
enterprise is denoted by Y > 1. This output, or revenue, should be thought of
as being net of the opportunity cost of the business owner’s time.
Borrowers’ businesses vary in their likelihood of success. In general, prob-
ability of success might be thought of as depending on an array of borrower
characteristics such as education, past business experience, and the nature of the
product or service being produced. A detailed list of characteristics is beyond
the scope of the model. Suppose that all of the relevant information about a
borrower can be reduced to a single summary statistic, or “score,” that can
be expressed as a probability. Hence, a borrower’s type is φ,0≤ φ ≤ 1.
An important market characteristic, then, is the distribution of individual bor-
rower types, represented by a cumulative distribution function F(φ). That is,
F(φ) denotes the fraction of the population with type no greater than φ. This
fraction increases with φ. Since φ is a probability, F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1.
This distribution function has an associated density, denoted by f(φ) where
f(φ) ≡ F (φ).
In addition to their individual types, businesses’ prospects may depend on
aggregate conditions. One way of introducing aggregate conditions into the
model is to assume that the economy is subject to an aggregate technology
shock that affects the output of successful ﬁrms. In this regard, Y should be
thought of as a random variable, the realization of which is not known until
ﬁrms observe their productive outcomes. Accordingly, a ﬁrm’s output is the
product of two random variables, its own success or failure and the aggregate
shock to technology. The expected output for a ﬁrm of type φ is φEY, where
EY is the expected value of Y.
An important ingredient of any model of resource allocation among
heterogeneous users is its information structure. The ability of market mecha-
nisms to assign resources to their most productive users can depend on whether      
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individual productive capabilities are public or private information.9 Similarly,
if it is difﬁcult for outsiders to observe a business’s productive outcome, then
the business may not be able to commit to payments contingent on that out-
come. This limit on payment schemes can, in turn, limit the opportunities for
gains from trade. In what follows, these complications are assumed away. This
simplifying assumption is not based on a belief that informational frictions are
not an important characteristic of ﬁnancial market transactions. Indeed, such
frictions are probably essential for understanding why ﬁnancial institutions
and contracts look the way they do. The assumption of perfect information
allows the model to focus more directly on the implications of diversity among
borrowers for the market allocation of credit.
Suppose that business owners have no funds of their own. Since there is an
interval of time between the employment of inputs and the realization of output,
providing a business with the funds to acquire inputs necessarily involves an
extension of credit. If there are limited funds available for acquiring resources,
or if there are alternative uses of funds that provide sufﬁcient returns, then some
businesses will operate and others will not. The credit market in this model
economy allocates savers’ funds to ultimate business borrowers and thereby
determines which ﬁrms operate.
Business borrowers are assumed to be risk-neutral, caring only about the
expected value of their proﬁts. A business is willing and able to borrow funds
if, after paying for the loan, it expects to cover at least the opportunity cost of
its owner-manager’s time. Since the resolution of uncertainty occurs between
the extension and the repayment of the loan, the measure of the cost of credit
relevant to the borrower’s decision is the expected payment. This expected
payment, or expected return from the lender’s point of view, plays the role of
the price in this market. That is, in order to attract funds, a borrower must be
able to offer payments that have an expected value equal to the market return,
denoted r.
Given a market return, r, any borrower whose expected output, φEY,i sa t
least equal to r will be willing and able to proﬁtably take a loan. Any such
borrower can fashion a feasible repayment schedule that yields an expected re-
turn of r to lenders. Repayment schedules, here, are particularly simple. Since
an unsuccessful business has no proceeds, no payment is made in that event. A
successful business can make a repayment up to its realized output Y. Since Y is
a random variable (common to all borrowers) that is realized before repayments
are made, the repayment by a successful borrower can be contingent on Y as
well as on the borrower’s type, φ. Hence, the repayment made by a successful
borrower will be denoted by ρ(φ,Y,r), where r is added as an argument to
indicate dependence on the required expected return.
9 See Lacker and Weinberg (1993) for a discussion of private information in a model very
similar to that in the present discussion.      
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The expected repayment from a type φ borrower is φEY[ρ(φ,Y,r)], where
the notation EY indicates expectation with respect to the aggregate random vari-
able Y. An “acceptable” payment schedule is one that, given the borrower’s
type, meets the market expected-return requirement. That is, to be acceptable,
a schedule must satisfy
φEY[ρ(φ,Y,r)] ≥ r. (1)
Recall that each loan is assumed to be one unit of funds. Therefore, given
the required expected return, r, the demand for funds is simply given by the
portion of the population of borrowers that can structure a payment schedule
that yields an expected payment of at least r. The most a successful borrower
can pay is the entire realized output, Y. A borrower who agrees to pay this max-
imum for all realizations of Y will be just indifferent between borrowing and
remaining idle. The lowest-type borrower for whom obtaining a loan that the
market ﬁnds acceptable will be worthwhile is the borrower for whom φEY = r,
or φ = r/EY. Hence, the demand for funds is the number of borrowers with
φ ≥ r/EY. Accordingly, demand can be expressed as a function of the required
return and the expected value of the aggregate technology shock:
D(r,EY) = [1 − F(r/EY)]N. (2)
The right-hand side of this equation is simply the size of the population, N,
times the fraction of borrowers with probabilities of success above the cut-
off value, r/EY. Notice that this function has the usual property of a demand
function: demand is decreasing in the cost of funds, r. In addition, all businesses
are willing to borrow when r = 0, and none will be willing when r = EY.
Given a cost of funds, the cut-off value of the individual probability of
success resembles a credit standard. This probability of success is assumed to
be a function of the observable characteristics of the borrower. Hence, setting
a minimum level for φ amounts to establishing a standard based on borrowers’
characteristics.
In addition to borrowers, the economy is populated by other individuals
who are endowed with funds in the ﬁrst period, but may seek to save some of
those funds for consumption purposes in the second period. Depending on the
existence of alternatives, some or all of these funds may be saved in the form
of loans to the business borrowers described above.
The behavior of savers will not be as carefully described as that of bor-
rowers. For purposes at hand, it is sufﬁcient to specify a function, S(r), that
determines the aggregate savings available to business borrowers. This function
could take a variety of forms. One possibility is that S(r) is a constant value
(perfectly inelastic). This would occur if loans to businesses constituted the
only outlet for savings and if savers’ preferences were such that their desired      
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savings were independent of the rate of return.10 Alternatively, if the business
borrowers represent only a small portion of the economy’s demanders of funds,
then the supply of funds to this small sector can be treated as perfectly elastic;
as much funding as is demanded will be forthcoming so long as borrowers are
able to pay an expected return at least as great as that available elsewhere in
the economy.
A last possibility for the behavior of savers arises if, for instance, they
use ﬁrst-period funds for both ﬁrst- and second-period consumption, and if
the only means of saving is through loans to businesses. In this case, savings
increase with r. The key maintained assumptions about S(r) are that S(0) < N
and S(EY) > 0. The ﬁrst of these two assumptions assures that if credit is free,
demand exceeds supply. The second implies that there are at least some rates
of return for which supply exceeds demand.
In addition to the expected return, savings may depend on other aggregate
conditions. For instance, one might imagine variation in savers’ ﬁrst-period
endowment. This endowment might be, in part, the result of an aggregate
shock in the ﬁrst period that may, in turn, affect people’s expectations about
the second-period technology shock. Hence, one can imagine shifts in aggre-
gate conditions that cause shifts in both the supply of funds by savers and the
demand of borrowers.
To this point, there has been no mention of the role of intermediaries in
the credit market. The model’s speciﬁcation is such that intermediaries are not
necessary to allocate effectively the economy’s resources among borrowers. In
fact, borrowers could sell securities, offering prorated shares of the payment
schedules, ρ(φ,Y,r). In equilibrium, a saver might own shares of the securities
issued by a variety of borrowers. The ability of borrowers to contract directly
with the savers arises from the absence of informational frictions in the model.
Although intermediaries are not necessary, one can imagine credit in this
economy ﬂowing through institutions that take the funds of savers, in exchange
for some promised return, and distribute those funds to borrowers. Borrowers,
then, make the payments ρ(φ,Y,r) to the intermediaries, who use those pay-
ments to pay the savers. If the activity of intermediating is costless and if
there is free entry into this activity, then, in equilibrium, intermediaries will
have zero proﬁts and the allocation of resources will be the same as in the
case of the direct securities market. While the discussion that follows will
adopt this interpretation of an intermediated credit market, note that the model
applies more generally to the competitive allocation of credit, with or without
intermediation.
It is assumed that all market participants—borrowers, savers, and inter-
mediaries—take the expected return, r, as given in making their economic
10 For instance, if savers care only about consumption in the second period, then they will
save all of their resources, regardless of the rate of return.          
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decisions. Under the intermediary interpretation, intermediaries attract total
savings of S(r), accept loan applications from borrowers, and adopt a lend-
ing standard. A lending standard, here, is simply a rule stating the minimum
acceptable probability of success. A type φ borrower takes a loan from the
intermediary that offers the lowest expected repayment, EY[ρ(φ,Y,r)], among
those that are willing to accept a type φ credit risk.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
The equilibrium expected return equates savers’ supply of funds to the demand
of the borrowers. Hence, equilibrium can be represented by a standard supply
and demand diagram, as in Figure 2.11 The market-clearing return, denoted r∗,
in turn determines the minimum acceptable probability of success. This lending
standard, ˆ φ, satisﬁes
ˆ φEY = r∗. (3)
Given this cut-off, the aggregate amount of credit extended is N[1−F(r∗/EY)].
Competition assures that each loan makes zero expected proﬁts for the lender.
This zero-proﬁt condition implies that repayment schedules for borrowers of
type φ are such that φEY[ρ(φ,Y,r∗)] = r∗. Note that all loans are risky in the
sense that a borrower only makes payments when successful (with probability
φ). Hence, for all but the best borrower (type φ = 1) there is a positive markup
between the average contractual repayment rate, EY[ρ(φ,Y,r∗)], and the cost
of funds, r∗. Notice, also, that this markup gets larger as the probability of
success, φ, gets smaller.
All lending brings with it an expectation of losses. A loss will be said
to occur when no payment is made. This amounts to deﬁning default as aris-
ing only from the borrower-speciﬁc failure to produce, not from variations in
payments arising from changes in the aggregate shock. That is, the loss on a
failed borrower is equal to the payment that would have been expected had
that borrower succeeded. For a type φ borrower, then, the expected loss to the
lender is weighted by the probability of failure:




Note that L(φ) is decreasing in φ, as one would expect.
Equation (4) gives a narrow speciﬁcation of losses. A loan to a given
borrower suffers a loss only if that borrower fails to produce a positive output.
A broader speciﬁcation of losses might include shortfalls of payments caused
by bad realizations of the aggregate shock. For instance, one might deﬁne a
loss as occurring any time the realized payment is less than EY[ρ(φ,Y,r∗)].
11 Note, however, that in Figure 2, price is on the horizontal axis.       
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Figure 2 Supply and Demand in the Credit Market
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This broader speciﬁcation would complicate the analysis without changing the
essential fact that expected losses rise as the probability of success falls.
The narrower speciﬁcation of losses, L(φ), treats as losses only those short-
falls resulting from borrower-speciﬁc performance. With the narrow speciﬁca-
tion, changes in the equilibrium lending standard will affect expected aggregate
losses primarily through the change in the riskiness of loans made. Since this
interaction is the intended focus of this article, the narrow speciﬁcation is







The right-hand side of equation (5) is the expected value of the function
L(φ,r∗), given that φ is greater than the threshold value ˆ φ. For each type,
L(φ,r∗)f(φ) gives the expected losses weighted by that type’s weight in the          
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population’s distribution of types. The integral, then, can be viewed as adding
up these weighted expected losses across all borrowers that receive loans.
Dividing by the number of borrowers receiving credit gives average losses.
The competitive equilibrium described above achieves an efﬁcient allo-
cation of funds.12 Given the expected technology shock, the market extends
credit to businesses from the top down, until the supply of funds has been
exhausted. In other words, it is impossible to ﬁnd two businesses, one funded
and one unfunded, such that the unfunded ﬁrm has a higher probability of
success. There is no “credit rationing” in the sense that the term is often used.
All borrowers who are willing and able to pay the required return (in expected
value) receive loans.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
As presented above, the key exogenous variable in the model is EY, the
expected value of the aggregate shock. Accordingly, all of the endogenous vari-
ables determined in equilibrium are functions of EY. Expectations, of course,
are not truly exogenous variables. Rather, economic decisionmakers form ex-
pectations by observing current conditions and making assumptions about the
relationship between current conditions and future conditions. Recall that the
model’s description speciﬁes a two-period time horizon. The market for funds
allocates credit in the ﬁrst period, based on expectations of conditions in the
second period. The expectation EY, then, may be a function of some condition
observed in the ﬁrst period. Since that condition would be exogenous to the
decisions made by borrowers and lenders, including the additional variable
would contribute little to the current analysis. This section, therefore, simply
treats EY as an exogenous variable and examines how the endogenous variables
respond to changes in EY.13
In terms of Figure 2, an increase in EY brings about an increase in de-
mand, as represented by an outward shift of the demand curve. For any required
return, the set of borrowers who can proﬁtably meet that requirement grows
as EY rises. Speciﬁcally, the marginal borrower is that for whom φEY = r;
this is the borrower who, if promising payments with expected value r, has
expected earnings net of payments just equal to zero. An increase in EY lowers
the marginal type. Hence, as expected aggregate conditions improve, riskier
borrowers become acceptable for any given required return.
12 A deeper discussion of the efﬁciency of equilibrium would have to include a more explicit
treatment of the economic decisions made by savers; as long as those decisions are such that an
equilibrium exists and there are no externalities, equilibrium will be efﬁcient (Pareto-optimal).
13 More precisely, the distribution of Y is assumed to be subject to exogenous changes.
Market participants are aware of the true distribution when they make their ﬁrst-period decisions
and, hence, form expectations rationally.        
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Of course, since more businesses are able to borrow proﬁtably at any given
return, market forces will cause the equilibrium required return, r∗, to rise if,
as in Figure 2, the supply of funds depends on the return to saving. The overall


















The right-hand side of this expression includes a direct and an indirect effect.
The direct effect is given by the second term; for a ﬁxed required return, r∗, ˆ φ
falls as EY rises. The ﬁrst term is the indirect effect that comes from the change
in r∗. If the increase in demand causes r∗ to rise, then the rising cost of funds
will dampen the decline in the lending standard. If the supply of funds is not
perfectly inelastic, the equilibrium lending standard falls, and credit is extended
to a wider range of borrowers as EY rises. If supply is perfectly elastic (for
instance, if this credit market is a small portion of broader ﬁnancial markets),
then the ﬁrst term on the right side of equation (6) is zero and only the direct
effect on ˆ φ is present.
Since all loans have some risk of loss, the expansion of lending when
expected conditions improve causes expected losses on loans to rise. Expected
losses, however, also rise as a percent of total loans. That is, ¯ L(r∗) rises as EY
rises. This can occur for two reasons. First, as seen in equation (4), the expected
loss on a loan to any given borrower rises if r∗ rises. Second, expansion of
lending comes at the bottom of the range of acceptable credit risks. Hence,
added borrowers bring greater-than-average expected losses.
Closely related to loan losses is the average markup of repayments by
businesses that do not fail over the cost of funds, r. This markup for a type
φ borrower is E[ρ(φ,Y,r∗)]/r∗. Since, in equilibrium, φE[ρ(φ,Y,r∗)] = r∗
for all acceptable borrowers, the markup for a type φ borrower is simply
1/φ. Therefore, for any given borrower, the average markup of repayment
(conditional on successful production) over the lender’s opportunity cost of
funds is independent of aggregate conditions. Accordingly, the average markup
across borrowers rises as the lending standard, ˆ τ, falls with a rising EY. Addi-
tional borrowers have a higher risk of failure and, therefore, must make greater
average payments, conditional on success.
5. DISCUSSION
Can the model presented above yield insights into cycles in lending stan-
dards? Recall that in a fully dynamic model, aggregate conditions would evolve
according to a process that would allow market participants to form the expec-
tation, EY, using observations of current and, perhaps, past conditions. More
precisely, EY would be a function of at least the most recently observed pro-
ductive (or proﬁt) experience of successful business ﬁrms.   
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If there is persistence in the aggregate technology shock that determines Y,
then expected output is high when current output is high. Hence, loan growth
and falling standards occur during good economic times. Since a lower standard
means the extension of credit to borrowers with a higher risk of default, it seems
as though movements in the lending standard can have the effect of widening
the swings in the economy, especially in downturns. If, when expectations were
high, a downturn occurs because of a low realization of Y, output falls not just
because of the low aggregate shock, but also because of the higher number of
failures of marginal borrowers. On the other hand, if the economy experiences
a string of good aggregate performance, it is possible to have a period of rising
losses while total loans and economic activity continue to grow. This possibility
might be reminiscent of much of the expansion of the U.S. economy in the
1980s.
In the model outlined above, changes in lending and lending standards
come entirely from the demand side of the market. It may be reasonable to
suppose that changes in aggregate conditions also affect the supply of funds.
In particular, if a high current value of the output of successful ﬁrms means
that savers’ total resources are correspondingly high, then the supply of funds
may expand together with the demand. This would tend to reinforce the effect
of aggregate shocks on the expansion of credit while making the effect on
expected returns ambiguous.
Popular discussions of changes in lending standards often implicitly treat
these changes as originating from the supply side. When standards rise, for in-
stance, there are often references and anecdotes concerning borrowers who are
being rationed out of the market. Such references seem to suggest that demand
has not changed, but that borrowers who are willing and able to take loans
under prevailing market conditions are being denied credit. Casual evidence,
however, is difﬁcult to interpret, particularly when credit ﬂows from suppliers
to demanders through intermediaries. One can interpret the model presented
above as one of an intermediated market. Under this interpretation, for the
market to achieve its equilibrium allocation it is not necessary for borrowers
to be aware of aggregate conditions. If every borrower submits applications
to one or more banks, then the banks, knowing the aggregate condition, will
make credit decisions according to the equilibrium described above. Hence, the
perceptions of borrowers who get screened out as standards rise (as EY falls)
can be misleading.
Another aspect of popular discussions of variations in lending standards
is the degree of competition among intermediaries. As in late 1994 and early
1995, observers often point to rising competition as a cause of weakening bank
standards. The model presented in this article, as a model of perfect compe-
tition, cannot capture rising competition. Presumably, if competitiveness is to
vary, competition must be imperfect. Imperfect competition might arise from
technological or legal barriers to entry. Procyclical competitiveness might arise   
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if lenders in an imperfectly competitive market ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to refrain
from aggressive competition during expansions. This sort of varying compe-
tition would reinforce the countercyclical lending standards of this article’s
model.
The model clearly does not imply that a goal of supervision and regulation
of ﬁnancial intermediaries should be to encourage “smooth” lending standards
that do not vary with aggregate conditions in the economy. Rather, the model
implies that in times of strong and improving economic activity, businesses
(and households) whose individual characteristics make them look risky may
become acceptable borrowers. A policy aimed at smoothing credit standards
would limit the ability of participants in the economy to adapt to changing eco-
nomic conditions and to take productive risks when those risks are warranted.
Of course, the existence of regulatory oversight of bank activities seems to
presume a bias toward excessive risk taking on the part of banks. The source of
that presumption is deposit insurance. It is not clear why the adverse incentive
created by deposit insurance should be greatest during periods of strong eco-
nomic performance and expanding credit. If anything, deposit insurance should
have its greatest effect on incentives at the other end of the cycle in credit
market conditions. The argument in the literature on this topic is that insured
lenders may have an incentive to “bet the bank” when they are in weak ﬁnan-
cial condition. This suggests that regulatory scrutiny of bank lending behavior
should be greatest during a period of low returns (proﬁtability) for banks.
6. CONCLUSION
Lending standards are usually thought of in terms of requirements placed on the
characteristics of individual loans and borrowers. A central point of this article
is that there is a natural tendency for standards to vary inversely with the level
of activity in the credit markets. There is, of course, a sense in which lending
standards do not vary at all in this article’s model. The marginal borrower is
always that borrower who can just afford repayment terms that just cover (in
expected value) the opportunity cost of savers’ funds. That the quality of the
marginal borrower varies is the result of the interaction of individual and ag-
gregate conditions in determining the payoff to extending credit. As (expected)
aggregate conditions improve, a borrower who did not look creditworthy yes-
terday may now be deserving of credit.
The frictionless model examined herein is missing many of the ingredients
that are perhaps important to the character of modern credit markets and insti-
tutions. Even with further complications, however, the fundamental role of the
credit market would be the same. Given perceptions of the general condition
of the economy, the credit market sets a threshold for acceptable risks. If the
market functions well, subject to whatever imperfections may be present in    
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the economic environment, then an improvement in participants’ perceptions
of aggregate conditions will lower the threshold.
The concerns about credit quality that are often expressed in times of
expanding credit are typically driven by very current news. A more “global”
perspective would recognize the interaction of individual and aggregate condi-
tions. The model examined in this article suggests that a policy goal of credit
standards that are constant over time is not only unwarranted, but could be
counterproductive.
REFERENCES
Bernanke, Ben S., and Cara S. Lown. “The Credit Crunch,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 2:1991, pp. 205–47.
Connor, John. “Comptroller Unveils Credit Committee, Citing Slippage in
Banks’ Loan Standards,” The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1995, p. 2.
Cunningham, Donald F., and John T. Rose. “Bank Risk Taking and Changes in
Financial Condition of Banks’ Small and Midsized Commercial Customers,
1978–1988 and 1988–1991,” Journal of Financial Services Research, vol.
8 (December 1994), pp. 301–10.
Darin, Robert M., and John R. Walter. “Were Bank Examiners Too Strict with
New England and California Banks?” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Economic Quarterly, vol. 80 (Fall 1994), pp. 25–47.
Dunaief, Daniel. “Bankers Agree: Credit Standards Have Been Sliding,”
American Banker, April 11, 1995, pp. 1 and 24.
Kareken, John H. “Deposit Insurance Reform or Deregulation Is the Cart, Not
the Horse,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol.
7 (Spring 1983), pp. 1–9.
Lacker, Jeffrey M., and John A. Weinberg. “Coalition Proof Equilibrium in a
Private Information Credit Economy,” Economic Theory, vol. 3 (Spring
1993), pp. 279–96.
Mathews, Gordon. “Worries Grow that Downturn in Economy Could Punish
Banks for Easing Credit,” American Banker, March 27, 1995, pp. 1 and
28.
Mueller, Henry P., and Leif Olson. “Credit and the Business Cycle,” in Herbert
V. Prochnow, ed., Bank Credit. New York: Harper and Row, 1981, pp.
78–91.
Owens, Raymond E., and Stacey L. Schreft. “Identifying Credit Crunches,”
Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 13 (April 1995), pp. 63–76.   
18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Rajan, Raghuram G. “Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and
Some Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109 (May 1994),
pp. 399–441.
Randall, Richard E. “Safeguarding the Banking System in an Environment
of Financial Cycles: An Overview,” New England Economic Review,
March/April 1994, pp. 1–13.
Schreft, Stacey L., and Raymond E. Owens. “Survey Evidence of Tighter Credit
Conditions: What Does it Mean?” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Economic Review, vol. 77 (March/April 1991), pp. 29–34.
Stevenson, Bruce G. “Research Report . . . Capital Flows and Loan Losses
in Commercial Banking,” Journal of Commercial Lending, vol. 77
(September 1994), pp. 18–26.